The Mental Act Of Sensation

When We Come To Images Or Memories Or Thoughts, Speculation, While Always Closely Related To Practice, Is More Explicit, And It Is In Fact Not Immediately Obvious That Such Processes Can Be Described In Any Sense As Practical.

An Object Is Not First Imagined Or Thought About And Then Expected Or Willed, But In Being Actively Expected It Is Imagined As Future And In Being Willed It Is Thought.

It Is Convenient To Distinguish The Two Kinds Of Experience Which Have Thus Been Described, The Experienc-ing And The Experienc-ed, By Technical Words.

What Is The Meaning Of The Togetherness Of The Perceiving Mind, In That Peculiar Modification Of Perceiving Which Makes It Perceive Not A Star But A Tree, And The Tree Itself, Is A Problem For Philosophy

We Cannot Therefore Say That Mental Acts Contain A Cognitive As Well As A Conative Element.